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Life Onboard |
LAST UPDATE
July 19, 2005
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| July 18, 2004 |
International Student Report - Yu Chang – Taiwan's
Politics of Patience |
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| Yu Chang and Peace Boat at Keelung Port, Taiwan |
According to the United Nations (UN), Yu Chang's country stopped existing as a member of the international
community in 1971, when Chiang Kai-shek and his Nationalist Kumointang Party was expelled as the
legal representative of China to the UN. The People's Republic of China thus became seen as the "only
lawful representatives of China" and Beijing became internationally recognized as the seat
of Chinese rule. The definition of Taiwan as a province of communist China, an independent sovereign
state, or something in between has been in limbo ever since.
But for Chang, 23, an International Student
on Peace Boat's 46th Global Voyage and a Taiwanese International Relations graduate student, the
reality of Taiwan is one increasingly at odds - both with China's insistence that Taiwan is part
of China, and with its own Kuomintang Party, which insists that China was "stolen" by the communist Chinese. Only making up 14 percent of the population,
who immigrated from the mainland in 1949, the Kuomintang ruled Taiwan until 2000. Because of this,
what Chang learned in school "was about Chinese history and Chinese geography, not about
Taiwan itself."
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| Japanese colonial period photo on display at Taipei's 2.28 Memorial Museum |
Yu Chang feels that the people of Taiwan have been locked in a constant struggle to define themselves
in the face of the much larger and more powerful China."I think most of what people hear about
Taiwan is from China." In recent years this has contributed to a flourishing environment for
civil society - to the point that there are now 25,000 NGOs for a population of 23 million people.
"Diplomatically and politically Taiwan is isolated, so we see NGOs as a channel to educate
people outside the country." Chang doesn't think Taiwanese people need another government to
oversee the island nation's affairs. "Most young people in Taiwan are for independence and
I'm not the exception." In contrast to this, though, he says he can envision a time when unification
might serve the peoples' best interests. "But it must be done equally, not imposed as if China
says we are one and you [Taiwan] have no choice. In the case [that there is equality], I can accept
us being united." |
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| Keelung Harbor |
China's "one country, two systems" policy towards Taiwan is demonstrated in the relationship
with the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (SAR), which is acknowledged by some as a indicator
for China's future policies towards Taiwan. Chang points out that, "They [Beijing] need to prove
it really works...they have tried really hard, but actually it didn't work so well. Compared to Taiwan,
there is much less freedom. In Taiwan, we have our own president, but in Hong Kong they can't even
choose their own governor." For the past 10 years opinion polls of Taiwanese have shown that
around 80 percent consistently oppose China's policy to unite. "So I think it's almost impossible
for this system to work." |
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| Chiang Kai-shek's Mausoleum in Taipei |
A link exists that provides a natural starting point for a peaceful resolution of Taiwan's status. "Politically
we are enemies towards each other, but economically and culturally China and Taiwan have very close
ties." If this slow but steady process involving constructive dialogue continues, Chang envisions
Cross Strait relations becoming more like the European Union, with shared foreign policy, military
and monetary currency.
There is a growing revolution among Taiwanese about how China treats Taiwan. According to statistics
gathered by the government, in the past five years the number of people who see China as unfriendly
to the Taiwanese government has dropped from 82 percent to 66 percent in 2004. Chang predicts that, "After
ten or twenty years the ties will become closer and closer and then maybe one day we will not feel
we have to discriminate between the two." |
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| International Students participating in a presentation |
The role of the United States in the Cross Straits issue has become more complicated as US foreign
policy has shifted favor away from democratic Taiwan as the Chinese economy has grown at an impressive
rate. "If the US President makes a wrong decision or sends the wrong message, then maybe a war
will be possible," proposes Chang. "There are ambivalent feelings among Taiwanese, who fear
what might happen if the United States is not present to counter-balance China. Most Taiwanese don't
like the intervention of the United States - to let the US decide our future fate - but at least the
United States decreases the chances of a war between China and Taiwan."
Recently there were loud protests against Taiwan's purchase of over $20 billion of weapons from
the United States. "Most of the people are against it, because these weapons are useless for
improving things between Taiwan and China," says Chang, who believes the weapon purchase is
a kind of "security payment" to the United States. |
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| Sculpture commemorating Taiwanese killed or disappeared by the Nationalist Kuomintang
Party |
Chang sympathizes with the toll that Cross Straits militarization is exacting on ordinary Chinese
people. For China, this means more than 30 percent of their national budget, while Taiwan spends around
20 percent. Chang sees this as an unnecessary drain on China, where already widespread poverty is
increasing due to economic privatization. China's open door policy, started during the 1980s and continuing
today, has created new complexities such as changing the United States' role, but it has also brought
positive signs. "In the past Beijing didn't have to consider what other countries might think
about what they do." As the development of civil society affects change in Taiwan and also starts
to take hold in China, the government will have less influence on media. In that atmosphere, people
will have greater access to information, changing the nature of the independence issue by bringing
the debate past leaders and out into general society. "And then the Chinese might accept a different
kind of solution." |
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